The Great Game continues: India’s role in a new Afghanistan
The Great Game continues: India’s role in a new Afghanistan
Recent months have seen a dramatic turnaround in Afghanistan—the two decades-long Afghan war, embroiling the world’s sole superpower, has now come to an abrupt end. With the final withdrawal and tacit surrender of American forces in the war, the Islamic Republic collapsed, giving way to the takeover by the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. Needless to say, governments, along with NGOs and intergovernmental organisations across the world are now scrambling to figure out what the situation on the ground is and what is to be done. As the situation becomes clearer with each passing day, it is worth observing the stance which the Indian government will take in the face of the new reality. Understandably, there is much confusion and conflict amongst discussion circles as to what India’s reaction to the new Taliban regime should be, essentially boiling down to the fundamental question: to engage or not to engage?
In this article, I intend to present my analysis on what the ideal course of action should be for the Indian government in the face of this new situation. Based on my assessment, I argue that the Indian government should acquiesce to this new geostrategic reality of a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and should now move towards engaging in dialogue and relations with the new regime.
The most fundamental premise on which my argument rests is this: the Taliban regime is very much a long-term geostrategic reality—the Islamic Emirate is here to stay. To imagine a ‘people’s resistance’ or a reboot of the past Northern Alliance, armed and capable of taking on the Taliban, is wishful thinking. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is no viable Afghan resistance to the Taliban. While leaders like Amrullah Saleh and Ahmed Massoud have stood tall against the Taliban in the Panjshir Valley, their efforts have been for nought. The Valley is under siege by the Taliban, and if it has not fallen yet, it is only a matter of time. Unlike the 1990s and 2000s, there is no Northern Alliance opposing the Taliban, and thus the Panjshir Valley’s supply routes to and from neighbouring Tajikistan are now under Taliban control. Further, no warlords in any other part of Afghanistan remain standing in a position to oppose the Taliban; most of them were defeated in the Taliban onslaught of the past few months. The most resistance that has been witnessed has been in the form of protests and demonstrations on the streets of Kabul, particularly for the cause of women’s rights. However, these have been brutally curtailed by the new regime, and counter-protests in favour of sharia law and its restrictive practices have also been orchestrated. All these facts on the ground indicate that the Taliban can now rule almost unopposed within Afghanistan, with no meaningful foreign assistance being given to a rival front and the only organised resistance now collapsing in the Panjshir Valley.
Secondly, for those arguing for Indian support to the Panjshir resistance—very simply put, India lacks the capacity for such an endeavour. A direct Indian military presence is a serious no-go; Afghanistan is where the world’s largest superpowers have capitulated on the battlefield, and India is still a rising power with serious limitations to its hard power capabilities, making this an impractical consideration. Indian assistance to some form of local resistance is also unviable for a number of reasons. The first of these is that India has very little capacity for such an endeavour—the effects of the pandemic and the pre-pandemic slowdown in growth have taken serious tolls on our economy, and the government budget is completely debt-ridden. With rising defence commitments on its Western, Northern, and North-Eastern borders, Indian capacities are already stretched thin. Further, even if India were in a position to prop up an Afghan resistance, it would most likely be alone in such an endeavour, given that most of the international community is eyeing the Taliban-engagement route, having recognised its presence as being a long-term and unchangeable reality. Without support from the international community, India would have its work cut out in such an endeavour, and would likely lose out on the soft power and diplomatic goodwill it has worked so hard to achieve over the decades.
With all these points in mind, it can be fairly concluded that the Taliban is here to stay (notwithstanding reports of internal discord within its various factions, the impacts of which can only be observed over time). But this still does not tell us why India should pursue a policy of dialogue with the Taliban, which until a few months ago, was just a rogue terrorist outfit. There are three aspects that need to be addressed for this part of the argument: a) the importance of conducting realpolitik in our foreign relations, b) the fault-lines in the Taliban-Pakistan alliance, and c) a cost-benefit analysis of engaging or not engaging in dialogue with the Taliban.
Firstly, on the importance of incorporating realpolitik in our foreign relations. In his recent book, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar outlined a vision for Indian foreign policy under the present administration, wherein he strongly emphasised on the changed scenario of global geopolitics today. He stresses on the fact the present world order is one where ‘multipolarity’ reigns stronger than ‘multilateralism’. To put it rather crudely, the present world order is one of greater competition as opposed to cooperation. Ideology matters less, and traditional distinctions of ‘allies’ and ‘rivals’ are now giving way to specific area-based cooperation or conflict. The most vivid illustration of this is seen in Afghanistan itself—the otherwise radical Islamist Taliban, which claims to stand for the interests of Muslims across the world, has recently begun making deals with China, which is known to oppress the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, whilst discarding all ties with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uighur terrorist group. The US itself has been involved in negotiations with the Taliban in Doha for several years now, even as it was waging war against the very same group in Afghanistan. It is not just in Afghanistan, but in all aspects of our foreign relations, that India ought to conduct a realpolitik divorced from ideology, and more importantly, from idealism. The US waged the War on Terror with an objective of ‘democracy promotion’ for two decades, and after suffering multiple humiliating defeats in West Asia and Africa, the Trump and Biden administrations decided to return to a realist paradigm of foreign policy, along the lines of John Quincy Adam and Theodore Roosevelt’s conceptions of non-interventionist foreign policy. India too must deal with the new Taliban regime—despite reservations on human rights and democracy promotion—on the basis of a realist outlook. Ostensibly, this may appear to be a cold-hearted formulation of policy; to address this contention, it is pertinent to recall India’s warm relations with the likes of Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Iran, Russia, and countless others. The Taliban would be a mere singular addition to an already long list of ‘morally’ questionable foreign policy decisions—but a necessary one nonetheless (after all, one need not try too hard to imagine the consequences of discarding ties with the aforementioned nations purely on an ideological plank). Therefore, once India recognises the Taliban to be a geopolitical reality that is here to stay for the foreseeable future, it must drop the ‘Taliban equals terrorist’ policy lens (to paraphrase The Print’s Shekhar Gupta). Short of mobilising a global coalition to crusade for human rights in the Islamic Emirate, India cannot really do much to affect the human rights situation in the country—and recent events have already demonstrated the lack of willingness in the international community for any such effort. Of course, this is by no means a call to completely ignore the lack of democracy and human rights in Afghanistan—Prime Minister Narendra Modi already outlined these concerns at the recent SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit—and by no means should India feel any compulsion to formally recognise the Taliban regime; just that these matters must not preclude any dialogue whatsoever.
Now, addressing the fault-lines in the Taliban-Pakistan alliance. The Pakistani establishment may have been the principal patron of the Taliban for almost half a century, but this does not mean that a permanent alliance between the two is a foregone conclusion (in Afghanistan, few things are). History has set a precedent for this—the mujahideen trained and financed by the US in the Afghan-Soviet War went on to kill over three thousand innocents on American soil scarcely two decades later. Of course, that the Taliban would immediately turn on Pakistan is a far-fetched notion—but the stability of this relationship is not something to be taken for granted, and is susceptible to strains in the future. This is primarily because of two opposing forces at work in the new Afghanistan—one of a Taliban regime that is seeking to assert its independence and sovereignty, and the other being of a Pakistani establishment which sees the present situation as a Pakistani victory and the new Afghanistan as a client state to do with as it pleases. The Pakistani establishment will no doubt view Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a geopolitical tool and a source of extremist proxies. However, in its quest for legitimacy, and hopefully after learning some lessons from being invaded by the US for harbouring Osama bin Laden, the Taliban will think twice before sheltering any and all terrorists on Afghan soil. It has already come into conflict with the ISIS-K (Khorasan), an Afghan affiliate of ISIS, and has expelled the East Turkistan Islamic Movement from Afghanistan (in an evident attempt to placate an insecure China). The possible reluctance of the Taliban in being treated as a terrorist proxy by Pakistan could be leveraged by India to alleviate its security concerns. Only engaging in dialogue with the Taliban will allow India to gauge the Taliban’s intent and willingness to reign in terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil. If there is any chance to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and others, India cannot risk not engaging with the Taliban.
Finally, a cost-benefit analysis of engaging with the Taliban. The costs are obvious at first glance: a secular democracy like India engaging in dialogue with a radical Taliban which violently seized power cannot possibly be an easy choice to make. It comes with its own moral and political consequences, entailing the risk of a huge blow to the Indian government’s credibility at home and abroad if such an effort backfires. However, the costs of not engaging may be greater. Presently, with the exit of the US from Afghanistan, and the Taliban government still in the process of consolidating power, there exists somewhat of a power vacuum, or at least an influence vacuum. Pakistan, China, and Russia recognised this reality early on: while Pakistan already has a foot in the door, China and Russia have been quick to initiate dialogue with the Taliban. China so far has made the greatest inroads, with the expulsion of ETIM from the country by the Taliban and the pledging of $31 million by China in the country. India must look beyond its inhibitions and make its presence felt in the country. If other targets of Islamist terror like Russia and China can engage with the Taliban, so can India. An opportunity for this exists as well: Russia, the US, and the UK have recently begun discussions with India with regards to the Afghan situation, likely because they recognise the importance of India as a pre-eminent regional power and an important bulwark against terrorism. Russia may be conducting diplomacy with the Taliban, but it will view it with suspicion. India will benefit by constructively engaging with the Taliban by increasing the prospects of crowding out Chinese interests and by pre-empting the Taliban from becoming a terrorism-exporter. Further, only by engaging with this regime will India be able to try and influence issues of human rights, equality, and inclusivity in Afghanistan.
What is the likelihood of such a policy being implemented by India? It is unclear at this moment. India has so far expressed reluctance in officially recognising the Taliban regime, with the Ministry of External Affairs stating that it shall closely monitor the situation at present. Further, the ruling party has ideological considerations to cater to. While the government cannot openly be seen to fraternise with the Islamic Emirate, given its ideological commitment to Hindu nationalism and its electoral plank of anti-terrorism, it also realises that alienating the Taliban regime would be a folly in the game of international relations (the latter is evident from the fact that the government has not openly condemned the Taliban regime just yet, but has rather implored it to respect human rights in Afghanistan).
The Indian government and foreign policy establishment are conducting a delicate balancing act at present, having to balance multiple conflicting considerations within foreign and domestic policy. It must realise the importance of not allowing ideology to come in the way of pragmatism and thus put India in a position to make inroads into the Afghan power vacuum. If able leadership and cool-headed policymaking reign supreme in New Delhi, there is cause for optimism.
In this article, I intend to present my analysis on what the ideal course of action should be for the Indian government in the face of this new situation. Based on my assessment, I argue that the Indian government should acquiesce to this new geostrategic reality of a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and should now move towards engaging in dialogue and relations with the new regime.
The most fundamental premise on which my argument rests is this: the Taliban regime is very much a long-term geostrategic reality—the Islamic Emirate is here to stay. To imagine a ‘people’s resistance’ or a reboot of the past Northern Alliance, armed and capable of taking on the Taliban, is wishful thinking. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is no viable Afghan resistance to the Taliban. While leaders like Amrullah Saleh and Ahmed Massoud have stood tall against the Taliban in the Panjshir Valley, their efforts have been for nought. The Valley is under siege by the Taliban, and if it has not fallen yet, it is only a matter of time. Unlike the 1990s and 2000s, there is no Northern Alliance opposing the Taliban, and thus the Panjshir Valley’s supply routes to and from neighbouring Tajikistan are now under Taliban control. Further, no warlords in any other part of Afghanistan remain standing in a position to oppose the Taliban; most of them were defeated in the Taliban onslaught of the past few months. The most resistance that has been witnessed has been in the form of protests and demonstrations on the streets of Kabul, particularly for the cause of women’s rights. However, these have been brutally curtailed by the new regime, and counter-protests in favour of sharia law and its restrictive practices have also been orchestrated. All these facts on the ground indicate that the Taliban can now rule almost unopposed within Afghanistan, with no meaningful foreign assistance being given to a rival front and the only organised resistance now collapsing in the Panjshir Valley.
Secondly, for those arguing for Indian support to the Panjshir resistance—very simply put, India lacks the capacity for such an endeavour. A direct Indian military presence is a serious no-go; Afghanistan is where the world’s largest superpowers have capitulated on the battlefield, and India is still a rising power with serious limitations to its hard power capabilities, making this an impractical consideration. Indian assistance to some form of local resistance is also unviable for a number of reasons. The first of these is that India has very little capacity for such an endeavour—the effects of the pandemic and the pre-pandemic slowdown in growth have taken serious tolls on our economy, and the government budget is completely debt-ridden. With rising defence commitments on its Western, Northern, and North-Eastern borders, Indian capacities are already stretched thin. Further, even if India were in a position to prop up an Afghan resistance, it would most likely be alone in such an endeavour, given that most of the international community is eyeing the Taliban-engagement route, having recognised its presence as being a long-term and unchangeable reality. Without support from the international community, India would have its work cut out in such an endeavour, and would likely lose out on the soft power and diplomatic goodwill it has worked so hard to achieve over the decades.
With all these points in mind, it can be fairly concluded that the Taliban is here to stay (notwithstanding reports of internal discord within its various factions, the impacts of which can only be observed over time). But this still does not tell us why India should pursue a policy of dialogue with the Taliban, which until a few months ago, was just a rogue terrorist outfit. There are three aspects that need to be addressed for this part of the argument: a) the importance of conducting realpolitik in our foreign relations, b) the fault-lines in the Taliban-Pakistan alliance, and c) a cost-benefit analysis of engaging or not engaging in dialogue with the Taliban.
Firstly, on the importance of incorporating realpolitik in our foreign relations. In his recent book, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar outlined a vision for Indian foreign policy under the present administration, wherein he strongly emphasised on the changed scenario of global geopolitics today. He stresses on the fact the present world order is one where ‘multipolarity’ reigns stronger than ‘multilateralism’. To put it rather crudely, the present world order is one of greater competition as opposed to cooperation. Ideology matters less, and traditional distinctions of ‘allies’ and ‘rivals’ are now giving way to specific area-based cooperation or conflict. The most vivid illustration of this is seen in Afghanistan itself—the otherwise radical Islamist Taliban, which claims to stand for the interests of Muslims across the world, has recently begun making deals with China, which is known to oppress the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, whilst discarding all ties with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uighur terrorist group. The US itself has been involved in negotiations with the Taliban in Doha for several years now, even as it was waging war against the very same group in Afghanistan. It is not just in Afghanistan, but in all aspects of our foreign relations, that India ought to conduct a realpolitik divorced from ideology, and more importantly, from idealism. The US waged the War on Terror with an objective of ‘democracy promotion’ for two decades, and after suffering multiple humiliating defeats in West Asia and Africa, the Trump and Biden administrations decided to return to a realist paradigm of foreign policy, along the lines of John Quincy Adam and Theodore Roosevelt’s conceptions of non-interventionist foreign policy. India too must deal with the new Taliban regime—despite reservations on human rights and democracy promotion—on the basis of a realist outlook. Ostensibly, this may appear to be a cold-hearted formulation of policy; to address this contention, it is pertinent to recall India’s warm relations with the likes of Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Iran, Russia, and countless others. The Taliban would be a mere singular addition to an already long list of ‘morally’ questionable foreign policy decisions—but a necessary one nonetheless (after all, one need not try too hard to imagine the consequences of discarding ties with the aforementioned nations purely on an ideological plank). Therefore, once India recognises the Taliban to be a geopolitical reality that is here to stay for the foreseeable future, it must drop the ‘Taliban equals terrorist’ policy lens (to paraphrase The Print’s Shekhar Gupta). Short of mobilising a global coalition to crusade for human rights in the Islamic Emirate, India cannot really do much to affect the human rights situation in the country—and recent events have already demonstrated the lack of willingness in the international community for any such effort. Of course, this is by no means a call to completely ignore the lack of democracy and human rights in Afghanistan—Prime Minister Narendra Modi already outlined these concerns at the recent SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit—and by no means should India feel any compulsion to formally recognise the Taliban regime; just that these matters must not preclude any dialogue whatsoever.
Now, addressing the fault-lines in the Taliban-Pakistan alliance. The Pakistani establishment may have been the principal patron of the Taliban for almost half a century, but this does not mean that a permanent alliance between the two is a foregone conclusion (in Afghanistan, few things are). History has set a precedent for this—the mujahideen trained and financed by the US in the Afghan-Soviet War went on to kill over three thousand innocents on American soil scarcely two decades later. Of course, that the Taliban would immediately turn on Pakistan is a far-fetched notion—but the stability of this relationship is not something to be taken for granted, and is susceptible to strains in the future. This is primarily because of two opposing forces at work in the new Afghanistan—one of a Taliban regime that is seeking to assert its independence and sovereignty, and the other being of a Pakistani establishment which sees the present situation as a Pakistani victory and the new Afghanistan as a client state to do with as it pleases. The Pakistani establishment will no doubt view Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a geopolitical tool and a source of extremist proxies. However, in its quest for legitimacy, and hopefully after learning some lessons from being invaded by the US for harbouring Osama bin Laden, the Taliban will think twice before sheltering any and all terrorists on Afghan soil. It has already come into conflict with the ISIS-K (Khorasan), an Afghan affiliate of ISIS, and has expelled the East Turkistan Islamic Movement from Afghanistan (in an evident attempt to placate an insecure China). The possible reluctance of the Taliban in being treated as a terrorist proxy by Pakistan could be leveraged by India to alleviate its security concerns. Only engaging in dialogue with the Taliban will allow India to gauge the Taliban’s intent and willingness to reign in terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil. If there is any chance to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and others, India cannot risk not engaging with the Taliban.
Finally, a cost-benefit analysis of engaging with the Taliban. The costs are obvious at first glance: a secular democracy like India engaging in dialogue with a radical Taliban which violently seized power cannot possibly be an easy choice to make. It comes with its own moral and political consequences, entailing the risk of a huge blow to the Indian government’s credibility at home and abroad if such an effort backfires. However, the costs of not engaging may be greater. Presently, with the exit of the US from Afghanistan, and the Taliban government still in the process of consolidating power, there exists somewhat of a power vacuum, or at least an influence vacuum. Pakistan, China, and Russia recognised this reality early on: while Pakistan already has a foot in the door, China and Russia have been quick to initiate dialogue with the Taliban. China so far has made the greatest inroads, with the expulsion of ETIM from the country by the Taliban and the pledging of $31 million by China in the country. India must look beyond its inhibitions and make its presence felt in the country. If other targets of Islamist terror like Russia and China can engage with the Taliban, so can India. An opportunity for this exists as well: Russia, the US, and the UK have recently begun discussions with India with regards to the Afghan situation, likely because they recognise the importance of India as a pre-eminent regional power and an important bulwark against terrorism. Russia may be conducting diplomacy with the Taliban, but it will view it with suspicion. India will benefit by constructively engaging with the Taliban by increasing the prospects of crowding out Chinese interests and by pre-empting the Taliban from becoming a terrorism-exporter. Further, only by engaging with this regime will India be able to try and influence issues of human rights, equality, and inclusivity in Afghanistan.
What is the likelihood of such a policy being implemented by India? It is unclear at this moment. India has so far expressed reluctance in officially recognising the Taliban regime, with the Ministry of External Affairs stating that it shall closely monitor the situation at present. Further, the ruling party has ideological considerations to cater to. While the government cannot openly be seen to fraternise with the Islamic Emirate, given its ideological commitment to Hindu nationalism and its electoral plank of anti-terrorism, it also realises that alienating the Taliban regime would be a folly in the game of international relations (the latter is evident from the fact that the government has not openly condemned the Taliban regime just yet, but has rather implored it to respect human rights in Afghanistan).
The Indian government and foreign policy establishment are conducting a delicate balancing act at present, having to balance multiple conflicting considerations within foreign and domestic policy. It must realise the importance of not allowing ideology to come in the way of pragmatism and thus put India in a position to make inroads into the Afghan power vacuum. If able leadership and cool-headed policymaking reign supreme in New Delhi, there is cause for optimism.
Very relevant and thought provoking and as always, superbly articulated. Afghanistan, whether you like it or not, retains it’s geostrategic significance even today. Whether it was the Great Game of the 19th century or it’s avatar in the 21st, Afghanistan remains central to the game. A thought I would like to share with you, while all the regions surrounding Afghanistan, be it China, Central Asia, South Asia, Iran, have displayed a significant growth trajectory over the past century, the Afghan nation has languished. Is it that the the players involved in the various versions of the Great Game, over the century, have somehow been party to this design. And I think it is this lack of development, across the spectrum of domains, that needs to be targeted for lasting peace in this region. Keep thinking, keep writing.
ReplyDeleteAn in depth and prudent analysis of the situation on ground. The challenge will be, how to engage with an Islamic regime when own ideology weighs more towards a Hindu majority. A dilemma which will need to be dealt with.
ReplyDeleteYour comments are of a seasoned professional and will benefit those who take note.
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